

BEYOND BULLETS: HOW MYANMAR'S JUNTA WAGES WAR WITH PROPAGANDA AND AI

Quarterly Report #3




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INTRODUCTION

▼ In the previous quarter of 2025 (April to June), the Myanmar pro-military online platforms aggressively disseminated content designed to fuel racial and religious animosity and justification for brutal aerial attacks. The other supporting narratives frequently promoted a “no-surrender” ideology, highlighted internal divisions within anti-junta forces, and openly incited real-world harm, including calls for airstrikes, doxxing campaigns, and forced conscription.

As the third quarter (July to September) unfolds, a significant narrative shift is anticipated. Pro-military pages are expected to increasingly push narratives related to sham elections, a strategic communication effort aimed at legitimizing a predetermined outcome and undermining any opposition. Concurrently, the Myanmar military junta(also known as State Security And Peace Commission (SSPC)) continues to perpetrate severe atrocities against the civilian population, demonstrating a blatant disregard for human rights and international law. Furthermore, a substantial upgrade to their surveillance capabilities is underway, with the deployment of advanced high-tech systems like PSMS (Person Scrutinization and Monitoring System) to enhance control and monitoring of opposition individuals and organizations.

The Myanmar military’s propaganda pages, prioritizing disinformation for these sham elections, are systematically collaborating with media-front organizations, political parties, and pseudo-media outlets that refrain from criticizing the junta. Their objective is to spread incitement that jeopardizes civilian security, leading to arrests, airstrikes, area clearances, and the propagation of racial and religious hatred and on the other hand to legitimize their political figures as rulers of the country.

Even when the military primarily relied on human resources for propaganda¹, the content generated posed a significant danger to the community. Therefore, with the rapid global advancement of AI technology, it is inevitable that during this sham election period, the junta will increasingly leverage AI to create and disseminate problematic propaganda as some of the AI generated contents have started circulating around pro-military channels.

This report will present findings and analysis from July to September 2025, detailing how junta has been altering narratives to foster ethnic hatred, fracturing resistance efforts, instigating real-world harmful actions against opposition groups and civilians, misusing journalistic imagery, and exploiting AI technology for propaganda.



¹ <https://Myanmar-now.org/mm/news/67238/>

1. THE JUNTA'S SHIFTING NARRATIVE ON THE ROHINGYA GENOCIDE

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The State Security And Peace Commission (junta), formerly known as SAC, shifting narrative regarding the Rohingya genocide reveals a concerted effort to deflect responsibility and undermine opposition groups, particularly evident in their responses to the 2012 communal violence², the 2016 crackdown³, and the 2017 clearance operations⁴. Following the 2021 coup, the Arakan Army (AA) has significantly expanded its influence and territorial control in Rakhine State, capitalizing on the post-coup instability and the military's stretched resources. This has allowed the AA to consolidate its administrative structures, increase its recruitment, and project itself as a legitimate governing authority in parts of the region, further complicating the political and humanitarian landscape. Due to the AA's significant growth, the Myanmar military has responded with increased not only military operations, including airstrikes and ground offensives, in an attempt to curb the AA's expansion and reassert control over the region, but also allege AA as racists and genocide perpetrators in the digital information space.

Deflection of Responsibility:

The junta is actively attempting to absolve itself of culpability for the horrific Rohingya genocide in 2016 and 2017. This is a classic tactic used by perpetrators of mass atrocities: to deny their actions and shift blame. The "evidence", likely from UN reports, human rights organizations, and victim testimonies, directly implicates the Tatmadaw. The junta's current narrative is a deliberate effort to rewrite history and avoid accountability.

Targeting the Arakan Army (AA):

By painting⁵ the AA as the primary perpetrator of atrocities against the Rohingya post-2021 coup, the junta serves multiple objectives. Firstly, it provides a convenient scapegoat, distracting from their own crimes⁶. Secondly, it aims to delegitimize the AA, which has emerged as a powerful ethnic resistance organization(ERO) challenging junta control in Rakhine State. Labeling the AA as a "terrorist group" is a common government tactic to justify military action against and garner international condemnation for resistance groups, regardless of their actual actions.

² <https://www.rescue.org/article/uprooted-Myanmars-rakhine-state#:~:text=June%209%2C%202017,of%20Sittwe%2C%20the%20state%20capital.>

³ <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2016/12/Myanmar-security-forces-target-rohingya-viscious-scorched-earth-campaign/#:~:text=Through%20interviews%20with%20survivors%20and,sometimes%20burned%20down%20whole%20villages.>

⁴ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/07/Myanmar-frees-reuters-journalists-jailed-for-reporting-on-rohingya-crisis#:~:text=At%20the%20time%20of%20their,led%20to%20accusations%20of%20genocide.>

⁵ <https://archive.ph/sx5go>

⁶ <https://archive.ph/cFAv3>

Propaganda Through Controlled Channels:	The use of “junta supporting channels” to “showcase voices from activists and organizations” ⁷ suggests a sophisticated propaganda operation. This control over information flow is crucial for shaping public opinion, both domestically and internationally.
Exploiting Vulnerabilities:	The allegations of AA involvement in forced conscription and civilian casualties of Rohingya and other groups are particularly damaging. Even if these claims are unverified or exaggerated ⁸ , they exploit the real suffering of these communities and sow mistrust among them ⁹ , potentially weakening the broader anti-junta movement.

In every conflict scenario in the Rakhine region, both Rohingya and Rakhine people consistently bear the brunt, with little to no escape from severe human rights violations, incitement to religious and ethnic hatred, and forced displacement. The military junta has exploited these incidents, politically leveraging narratives of anti-Rakhine and anti-Rohingya sentiment to escalate tensions between the two communities.

In September, AA leader General Twan Mrat Naing's visit to Maungdaw and the reopening of the Myoma Jame Mosque for Muslim worship garnered significant media and international attention. This act was widely recognized as demonstrating AA and the Rakhine people's acceptance of diversity and respect for other faiths. However, pro-military propaganda channels exploited the 2012 Ma Thida Htwe incident¹⁰, broadcasting hate speech. They asserted that Rakhine people should not accept Rohingyas and accused the AA leader of ceremoniously reopening a mosque that allegedly incited the killing of Rakhine people, rather than comforting the Rakhine community¹¹.

In a volatile turn of events at the tri-border region of Bangladesh, Myanmar, and India, specifically in Theingyi Nala, Khakasori District, Chittagong, four individuals have reportedly died following clashes between local Marma ethnic demonstrators and the Bangladeshi military. The protests erupted in late September over the alleged rape of a 12-year-old Marma girl, with demonstrators demanding justice. Concerns are mounting that the incident could escalate into wider racial unrest. Notably, some Rakhine-based and other news outlets have been observed reporting on the incident with ethnically charged narratives¹², accusing three Rohingya individuals of the crime is a critical situation to be monitored.

⁷ <https://www.facebook.com/FortifyRights/posts/%E1%80%9B%E1%80%81%E1%80%AD%E1%80%AF%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA%E1%80%95%E1%80%BC%E1%80%8A%E1%80%BA%E1%80%94%E1%80%9A%E1%80%BA-%E1%80%91%E1%80%94%E1%80%BA%E1%80%B8%E1%80%9B%E1%80%BE%E1%80%B1%E1%80%AC%E1%80%80%E1%80%BA%E1%80%81%E1%80%B6%E1%80%9B%E1%80%BD%E1%80%AC-%E1%80%9B%E1%80%80%E1%80%B9%E1%80%81%E1%80%AD%E1%80%AF%E1%80%84%E1%80%B7%E1%80%BA%E1%80%90%E1%80%95%E1%80%BA%E1%80%90%E1%80%B1%E1%80%AC%E1%80%BA-aa-%E1%80%99%E1%80%BE-%E1%80%9B%E1%80%AD%E1%80%AF%E1%80%9F%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA%E1%80%82%E1%80%BB%E1%80%AC%E1%80%99%E1%80%BB%E1%80%AC%E1%80%B8%E1%80%80%E1%80%AD%E1%80%AF-%E1%80%A1%E1%80%85%E1%80%AF%E1%80%9C%E1%80%AD%E1%80%AF%E1%80%80%E1%80%BA%E1%80%A1%E1%80%95/790753329954853/>

⁸ <https://archive.ph/SI2nk>

⁹ <https://archive.ph/bnWv3>

¹⁰ <https://www.fortifyrights.org/mya-inv-oped-2022-08-29/>

¹¹ <https://archive.ph/UcpmY>

¹² <https://burmese.narinjara.com/international/detail/68d778a5994665e2cce37afd>

Fortify Rights has presented evidence¹³ alleging that the AA committed mass killings of Rohingyas. The AA, in turn, has denied¹⁴ these accusations through media channels, claiming that no such incidents occurred and that those who died were soldiers from the military council's forces. Local residents have reportedly corroborated the AA's explanations, with some media outlets publishing their accounts. However, critics argue that the locals featured in video files and those who defected from the military council are speaking under duress from the AA. Currently, information flow and internet access in Rakhine State are under the control of the Arakan Army (AA). Furthermore, in September, the AA's detention¹⁵ of a female reporter from the Rakhine-based Border News Agency (BNA) has raised serious questions about press freedom in the region.



2. FUELLING ETHNIC HATRED AND DIVIDING RESISTANCE



The ongoing conflict in Myanmar has seen the junta employ insidious tactics to maintain its authoritarian grip. Rather than directly confronting all resistance, the junta is strategically exploiting existing divisions. A primary method involves fueling ethnic hatred and disrupting the unity of resistance movements. This document outlines how the junta weaponizes ethnicity, disseminates disinformation, and employs a classic “divide and conquer” strategy. Their ultimate goal is to undermine collective action and solidify their own rule. By understanding these tactics, resistance groups can better counter the junta's efforts to fracture their solidarity.

Weaponizing Ethnicity:

The junta is deliberately exploiting existing ethnic fault lines and historical grievances within Myanmar. By highlighting and amplifying conflicts between groups like Kachin vs Shan Ni¹⁶, Shan vs. Ta'ang¹⁷, MNDAA vs. Burmese¹⁸, and Chin vs. Arakan¹⁹, they are actively “fuelling ethnicity hatred.” This strategy is designed to prevent a unified front against the junta.

¹³ <https://Myanmar-now.org/mm/news/65403/>

¹⁴ <https://Myanmar-now.org/mm/news/66190/> , <https://www.facebook.com/theirrawaddyburmese/videos/%E1%80%91%E1%80%94%E1%80%BA%E1%80%B8%E1%80%9B%E1%80%BE%E1%80%B1%E1%80%AC%E1%80%80%E1%80%BA%E1%80%81%E1%80%B6%E1%80%9B%E1%80%BD%E1%80%AC%E1%80%99%E1%80%BE%E1%80%AC%E1%80%98%E1%80%AC%E1%80%90%E1%80%BD%E1%80%B1%E1%80%96%E1%80%BC%E1%80%85%E1%80%BA%E1%80%81%E1%80%B2%E1%80%B7%E1%80%9C%E1%80%B2%E1%80%9B%E1%80%AF%E1%80%95%E1%80%BA%E1%80%9E%E1%80%B6/1671507933476828/>

¹⁵ <https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1B5NC1FwuQ/?mibextid=wwXlfr>

¹⁶ <https://www.facebook.com/61579167746516/videos/2177528896092009/>

¹⁷ <https://archive.ph/d3GIG>

¹⁸ <https://archive.ph/00BY3>

¹⁹ <https://archive.ph/47lg3>

Disinformation and Propaganda:	The use of “viral videos (both verified and unverified) showing the disputes between ethnic armed troops and minor armed conflicts” is a key element of this strategy. Unverified videos can be easily manipulated or taken out of context to inflame tensions. Even verified videos of minor skirmishes can be presented in a way that suggests widespread conflict and animosity between groups, diverting attention from the primary struggle against the junta.
Strategic Objective: Divide and Conquer:	The “junta motives is to divide the alliance of ethnic armed groups and undermine the collective military operation from EROs.” This is a classic “divide and conquer” strategy. The diverse ethnic landscape of Myanmar, with its numerous ethnic resistance organizations(EROs) and their varying objectives, makes them vulnerable to such tactics. If these groups can be turned against each other, their combined military power and political leverage against the junta are significantly diminished.
Undermining Collective Action:	The ultimate goal is the “separation of Ethnic diversity.” By fracturing the solidarity among different ethnic groups and their respective armed wings, the junta aims to weaken the broader pro-democracy movement and solidify its own authoritarian rule. A disunited opposition is easier to defeat and control.

Ethnic hatred is often propagated in areas of instability, particularly during periods of Myanmar junta setbacks. Organized campaigns of disinformation are systematically carried out through media-impersonating pages and township-level groups, disseminating false narratives related to race and religion. These narratives are spread across various platforms, including Facebook pages and groups, through fake accounts infiltrating existing groups, and via Telegram channels. The objective is to propagate regional and ethnic hatred, specifically to sow discord that benefits the Myanmar junta.

A recurring theme in this propaganda is the portrayal of the Bamar people as oppressed and discriminated against by ethnic minority groups. This tactic aims to incite hatred towards ethnic minorities among the general population. By fracturing unity among ethnic groups, the Myanmar junta seeks to diminish opposition to its rule, a strategy it actively exploits to divide and conquer.



3. INCITEMENT TO VIOLENCE: AIRSTRIKES AND DOXXING




The junta and its online supporters are actively engaged in inciting real-world harm against civilians and opposition groups through dangerous narratives²⁰. A primary tactic involves labeling areas controlled by Ethnic Resistance Organizations (EROs) as “non-civilian” zones and “terrorist headquarters.” This deliberate mischaracterization is used to justify indiscriminate attacks, including airstrikes, on densely populated civilian areas. Even when

²⁰ <https://archive.ph/Sei7v>

Cont'd 3. Incitement to Violence: Airstrikes and Doxing

it is clear that civilians reside in these regions, the junta narrative labels them as “supporters of terrorist groups,” thereby stripping them of their protected status under international law. This manipulation of the definition of “civilians” is particularly insidious, as the junta and its proxies spread disinformation claiming that “ordinary civilians” have already evacuated ERO-controlled areas, and only “so-called civilians” who support EROs remain. This false premise seeks to legitimize military operations that result in civilian casualties.



Pages endorsing the military junta’s actions are consistently labeling non-civilian areas as targets, inciting airstrikes and posing a grave threat to civilians²¹. Instead of explicitly calling for aerial bombardments, the military’s supporters are using euphemisms like “playing music from the plane²²” or “dropping eggs” to circumvent social media platform restrictions. The military has consistently denied responsibility for these airstrikes, portraying them solely as counter-terrorism operations. However, ground-level evidence paints a grim picture: civilian casualties, destroyed homes, and damaged educational and religious structures. In a recent development, following Arakan Army (AA) leader Major General Twan Mrat Naing’s visit to Maungdaw in September, where he reopened the Maungdaw Jamé Mosque for Muslim worshippers, the junta’s propaganda machine is already insinuating that this move is a strategic ploy by the AA to prevent bombing the mosque and possibly establish it as an AA headquarters, thereby pre-emptively marking it as a military target²³.

Supporters of the military junta, who are instilling fear in the public through aerial assaults, continue to threaten civilian security with other forms of incitement. In 2025, with technological assistance from Russia and China²⁴, the junta has intensified efforts utilizing a Person Scrutinization and Monitoring System (PSMS) to control the private security of

²¹ <https://archive.ph/wip/1j0N6>

²² <https://archive.ph/M33Kk>

²³ <https://archive.ph/wip/FznKa>

²⁴ <https://progressivevoiceMyanmar.org/2025/07/20/65773/>

citizens²⁵. By the end of August, BBC News reported²⁶ that over 1,650 people had been arrested due to the PSMS, and the number of arrests continues to rise. Furthermore, pro-military propaganda pages are inciting²⁷ their supporters to document and collect online activities of anti-dictatorship activists abroad. These pages also consistently encourage denying passport renewals to anti-dictatorship Myanmar nationals living overseas, targeting them specifically²⁸.

The junta's crackdown on dissenters, fueled by calls for arrests, has become a potent weapon for the junta and its supporters. The council has extensively employed doxxing, a tactic that threatens freedom of expression by exposing private information. On July 29, the military council issued a law that imposes severe penalties, including the death penalty, for those who disrupt or oppose the upcoming election. Within 28 days of its enactment, the law was used for the first time, signaling a clear intent to deter public opposition to the election²⁹. Pro-military propaganda pages are actively targeting and instigating arrests³⁰ of individuals planning to participate in election boycott movements, and this trend is expected to continue³¹. Therefore, it is crucial for civilians and activists to exercise extreme caution for their safety.

The junta also has leverages to label anti-dictatorship armed groups as terrorists. In areas controlled by some revolutionary forces, certain members exploit the absence of rule of law, using military and security pretexts to commit acts against local populations, mirroring the military council's own oppressive tactics. Independent news outlets report incidents of wrongful accusations leading to killings³², suppression based on personal grievances, information blackouts, and forced conscription within areas controlled by some armed groups. The military council and its propaganda pages selectively leverage these incidents, continuously broadcasting that revolutionary forces are "terrorists oppressing the people," thereby justifying the military council's actions as necessary to "rescue them³³."



²⁵ <https://Myanmar-now.org/mm/news/64324/?tztc=1>

²⁶ <https://www.facebook.com/BBCnewsBurmese/videos/psms-%E1%80%85%E1%80%94%E1%80%BA%E1%80%94%E1%80%B2%E1%80%B7-%E1%80%9C%E1%80%B0%E1%80%90%E1%80%85%E1%80%BA%E1%80%9A%E1%80%B1%E1%80%AC%E1%80%80%E1%80%BA%E1%80%81%E1%80%BB%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA%E1%80%B8%E1%80%85%E1%80%AE-%E1%80%85%E1%80%B1%E1%80%AC%E1%80%84%E1%80%BA%E1%80%B7%E1%80%80%E1%80%BC%E1%80%8A%E1%80%BA%E1%80%B7%E1%80%81%E1%80%B6%E1%80%94%E1%80%B1%E1%80%9B%E1%80%9C%E1%80%AC%E1%80%B8-bbc-news-%E1%80%99%E1%80%BC%E1%80%94%E1%80%BA%E1%80%99%E1%80%AC/756907430522622/>

²⁷ <https://archive.ph/ZPFgl>

²⁸ <https://archive.ph/yHXxi>

²⁹ <https://archive.ph/CeKin>, <https://archive.ph/BxZKn>

³⁰ <https://archive.ph/8Jola>

³¹ <https://www.facebook.com/share/1LTeFoCxi3/?mibextid=wwXlfr>

³² <https://www.bbc.com/burmese/articles/ceq2y02wgylo>

³³ <https://archive.ph/wip/l8zEe>

4. THE JUNTA'S INTERNATIONAL AND PUBLIC RELATIONS STRATEGY

After years of international isolation, the Myanmar junta is actively trying to win over the global community, portraying itself as the legitimate government while labeling its opponents as terrorists. Key to these efforts have been the recognition from China and President Trump's discussions on tax matters. The commission has also reportedly spent hundreds of thousands of dollars on US-based lobbying firms to influence the American Congress and government³⁴. Furthermore, the commission has undertaken official visits to countries like Russia, China, and Belarus, presenting these engagements through propaganda channels to cultivate an image of international recognition.

Informal Activities Myanmar has frequently sought diplomatic and inter-governmental cooperation with neighboring Thailand to suppress anti-regime forces taking refuge there. Beyond official channels, informal efforts are also evident. In September, "Pauk Ko Taw," a figure known for inciting racial and religious hatred with ultranationalist ideology, visited Bangkok. He met with Thai nationalist leaders and urged them to locate and crack down on revolutionary forces³⁵. Pauk Ko Taw's primary antagonist, according to his statements, is an individual named "Nga Sii." Pauk Ko Taw publicly exposed Nga Sii's bank details and passport information, threatening to have his passport revoked to prevent him from seeking refuge in third countries³⁶.

The role of pseudo media The junta significantly promoted the role of "pseudo-media" in July, August, and September 2025. Key presenters from pages such as Kyaw Soe Oo of People Media, Kyaw Myo Min of NP news, Aung Min of Myanmar Hard Talk, and other front-facing individuals from these "imitation media" pages were officially invited by the Myanmar junta to attend events³⁷. There, they conducted interviews with individuals and published election-related data and political party news that independent exile news agencies find difficult to obtain³⁸. Those pseudo-journalistic persons who have been granted access to the junta's press conferences under the guise of media since the coup began are inevitably prioritized to disseminate information aligning with the junta's agenda in the sham elections to be held at the end of the year. And also the fact that these self-proclaimed media outlets were allowed to accompany the military commission on its foreign trips³⁹ reveals the military leader's patronage and his reliance on these pseudo-journalistic figures.

³⁴ <https://Myanmar-now.org/mm/news/67049/>

³⁵ <https://archive.ph/LsxeG>, <https://archive.ph/L5XRJ>, <https://archive.ph/NSyOL>

³⁶ <https://archive.ph/LbMEF>

³⁷ <https://archive.ph/f2p7u>

³⁸ <https://archive.ph/KS3Aj>

³⁹ <https://archive.ph/mfLZw>

Cont'd: The role of pseudo media

Pro-junta media outlets not only shy away from criticizing the military but also habitually conceal human rights violations and acts of terror perpetrated by the junta. These outlets consistently portray the junta's forces as saviors, thereby actively working to prolong the authoritarian regime. This group of so-called media includes individuals closely associated with the junta and the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). Bullet Hla Swe and Kyaw Swar, both retired military personnel, are reportedly collaborating with other pseudo media outlets and persona to manipulate the media landscape to their advantage.



Prominent celebrities and artists for junta propaganda use

Since July, the Myanmar junta has escalated its propaganda efforts, spreading news of a sham election. Concurrently, they have intensified counter-offensives, recapturing some townships previously held by revolutionary forces. Kyaw Myo Min and Thazin Oo, who control NP News, publicly claimed to have safely visited Moby and Ummati, areas recently retaken by the Myanmar junta, under military protection⁴⁰. Their reports served to bolster the junta's image.


Aung Min, founder of the online pseudo-media "Myanmar Hard Talk", disclosed that foreign news agencies had contacted him, requesting articles⁴¹. Aung Min is known for consistently presenting content that aligns with the junta's agenda, aiming to suppress the activities of democratic forces. Given his self-portrayal as a journalist who disseminates propaganda favoring the junta, it is highly likely that any articles he writes for international news agencies would contain information biased towards the junta and denigrate the anti-dictatorship resistance movement.

⁴⁰ <https://archive.ph/8AXor>, <https://archive.ph/Wr0Qz>

⁴¹ <https://archive.ph/EreLA>

Con'td: Prominent celebrities and artists for junta propaganda use

Despite initially opposing the military junta during the coup, artists and celebrities who signed pledges of allegiance are now being pressured by pro-military online pages. These pages consistently circulate messages urging the military council to exploit these figures for propaganda and threaten them against any further involvement in anti-dictatorship movements. Artists who previously supported the military council have willingly become tools for the regime, participating in their events and starring in their propaganda films. There have also been calls to enlist artists who signed pledges to produce educational videos for the military council's upcoming sham elections⁴².



In the third week of September, the junta's re-use⁴³ of the song "Let's Vote" by singer Lay Phyu drew widespread condemnation from revolutionary forces. News agencies reported that the song, originally released before the 2020 general election, was strategically re-employed by the Myanmar junta⁴⁴. This incident follows a past call by anti-dictatorship activists to boycott Lay Phyu, who they accused of mocking the term "boycott." Kyaw Myo Min, a pseudo-journalistic person, denied the fact of propagandizing for the Myanmar junta, defended junta, stating that "Let's Vote" is a national resource and the Myanmar junta(junta), as the government, has the right to use it⁴⁵. Furthermore, the Myanmar junta is also re-broadcasting "Let's Vote," another song written by Thahar Aung and performed by Manaw before the 2020 election, for its sham election again at the end of September⁴⁶. It is anticipated that the junta will increasingly utilize election campaign materials created during the NLD government's tenure in the coming period.



⁴² <https://archive.ph/w1D5E>

⁴³ <https://archive.ph/al8IW>

⁴⁴ <https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1BACKjhEPK/?mibextid=wwXlfr>

⁴⁵ <https://archive.ph/ed3Hm>


⁴⁶ <https://archive.ph/wip/aNIAV>

5. DANGERS OF AI-POWERED ABUSE

In an era marked by rapid technological advancement and increasing reliance on social media platforms, the sophisticated evolution of AI technology presents both positive and negative ramifications. The emergence of online profiles not only for individuals, organizations, and products, but also for pets and stray animals, clearly illustrates the extent to which living beings depend on and interact through social networks.

Conversely, the integration of AI technology and social media for malicious purposes is becoming increasingly prevalent. Globally, efforts are underway to combat AI-powered fraud and cybercrime. In mid-September 2025, Reuters highlighted the growing threat of online financial scams perpetrated with the aid of AI technology⁴⁷. Researchers specifically investigated the negative impact of AI-based messaging bots in facilitating these online scams. Furthermore, in September, social media users in Myanmar circulated warnings about the potential for fraudsters to manipulate bank transfer slips using Google's Gemini AI Nano Banana feature, which offers photo editing capabilities, to alter transaction amounts⁴⁸.

Similarly, AI is being increasingly misused in propaganda, fueling racial and religious hatred, attacking those with differing ideologies, and aggressively promoting specific doctrines. In Myanmar, there's a growing trend of AI-generated content appearing on pages that disseminate propaganda for the SSPP. These propaganda outlets demonstrate a sophisticated understanding of AI technology and are investing in paid services, as evidenced by the creation of lengthy AI-generated videos. While free AI video creation typically produces content around 10 seconds, longer videos usually require paid services or meticulous editing of short clips⁴⁹. However, Skyreel, a popular AI tool, stands out for its ability to generate significantly longer video files, even with unlimited duration. Nevertheless, utilizing such advanced AI still demands technical proficiency and the skill to direct the AI effectively.



⁴⁷ https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/ai-chatbots-cyber/?fbclid=IwZnRzaAM13-lleHRuA2FibQIxMQABHspR8wMwUkrI033HAfbdiGUnaWUahcJVQOx4mxwFQ9Jv9No2XT0UF-rZgcOY_aem_HUhW6gM1H3rcm6NwBNMb-g

⁴⁸ <https://archive.ph/1pfwo>

⁴⁹ <https://massive.io/gear-guides/the-best-ai-video-generator-comparison/>

The page primarily distributing AI-generated news-like video content is Voice of People, which operates across Telegram, TikTok, and YouTube platforms. This entity utilizes four main AI-produced human-like anchors with Burmese names such as Hla Yamin Oo, Nan Suwadi Min Ye Kyaw, and Kyaw Htut Swe. The presentations are divided into domestic and international news segments, often incorporating analytical formats⁵⁰. These videos typically range from three to ten minutes, mimicking the style of official news agencies. To maximize reach and audience engagement across various social media platforms, the videos are produced in both vertical and horizontal aspect ratios⁵¹.

Even before the widespread adoption of AI technology, the military junta and its supporters frequently employed a strategy of creating personas, disseminating propaganda through these brands, and operating in a manner akin to official news agencies. However, with the advent of advanced AI, this tactic has been significantly upgraded and is now being utilized with AI enhancements. Supporters of the military junta are manipulating AI by feeding it information that portrays the military and its leaders as Myanmar's legitimate rulers⁵². Simultaneously, they are using the technology to distort and attack revolutionary forces and the People's Defense Forces (PDFs) by labeling them as terrorists. If AI technology stores and presents information that recognizes the military dictator, who seized power and is committing atrocities, as the head of state, it effectively lends legitimacy to the military junta's efforts. While some AI chat functions currently do not produce such information supporting the military council's legitimacy when questioned about them, the fact that some AI allows for the creation of propaganda messages for the council raises serious concerns.



CONCLUSION



In the previous quarter, narratives of oppression and conflict among ethnic armed revolutionary organizations were prevalent, and this trend has continued into the current quarter. Religious and ethnic hate speech continues to be disseminated without interruption. Calls for arrests have expanded to include not only those opposing the military junta but also those opposing the sham election. Activities of individuals posing as media and political parties which are going to join Myanmar military organized sham elections are becoming more frequent.

In the third quarter of 2025, the Myanmar junta successfully recaptured strategically important townships, attempting to boost its declining operational image. The commission leader's foreign trips have also become more frequent. As China increasingly prioritizes its relationship with the Myanmar junta, it remains to be seen how far the commission can leverage Chinese support to gain legitimacy in the coming period. Media outlets that dare not criticize the Myanmar junta and those masquerading as media are being given platforms to further disseminate propaganda. It is also possible that new domestic media outlets and media imposters may emerge. In the arts and entertainment sector, the commission may exploit engaging content and popular figures for various purposes.

⁵⁰ <https://archive.ph/hbNsl>

⁵¹ <https://archive.ph/464cn>

⁵² <https://archive.ph/D8lHY>

With its control over territory shrinking nationwide, the military junta is desperately attempting to hold a sham election, relying on the few nations that still support it and the areas it continues to control. Simultaneously, with China's assistance, it is intensifying diplomatic pressure and launching ground and air offensives to reclaim townships from EROs. Against the Arakan Army (AA), which is less influenced by China, the junta is attempting to shift public perception by portraying the AA as the perpetrator of the Rohingya genocide, fueling anti-Rakhine sentiment, and responding with aerial attacks on the ground.



RECOMMENDATIONS



- » Given the severe internet blackouts and restrictions on social media, especially towards the end of the year when information flow is expected to increase, preparations should be made for civilian information consumption and safety.
- » To counter the military council's incitement of hatred, efforts should be made to educate the public on the dangers of racial and religious hatred and promote historical coexistence to prevent further deterioration of the current situation.
- » The inter ethnic dynamics and narrations on social media need to be monitored and addressed by the political leadership and policy making body in order to deeply prevent the ethnic dividing lines and hatred in the community level and information ecosystem.
- » Monitoring and vigilance are necessary regarding the activities of existing and newly emerging domestic media-imposter organizations, and preparations should be made for counter-disinformation campaigns.
- » AI technology needs to be utilized effectively. As AI is being used to spread misinformation and disinformation, methods to counter this must be explored. For example, fact-checking organizations, media outlets, and technology companies should feed accurate information to AI. Additionally, strategies should be implemented to counter the use of AI-generated misinformation prompts with pre-bunking messages.





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2025