1. Summary
During the second quarter of 2026 (April–June), Myanmar’s information environment became increasingly complex, shaped by political developments, military propaganda, AI-generated disinformation, seasonal misinformation, and ongoing armed conflict. The military authorities intensified efforts to rebrand the post-coup administration through a political transition that presented the junta leader as the country’s president while simultaneously seeking greater international legitimacy. At the same time, contradictory narratives emerged as official messaging promoted peace, reconciliation, and democratic transition, while military offensives, airstrikes, arrests, and restrictions on civic expression continued across the country.
The Red Flag’s continuous monitoring identified several dominant information trends during the quarter, including narratives related to political transition, military recruitment, peace negotiations, international recognition, revolutionary movements, severe weather events, education, and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Propaganda increasingly combined emotional messaging with manipulated images, recycled footage, and AI-generated content to influence public perception. Seasonal events—including Thingyan, school reopening, and the rainy season—also generated large volumes of misinformation, demonstrating how disinformation actors continue to exploit topics that attract high public attention.
Artificial intelligence emerged as one of the most significant developments during the quarter. AI-generated videos, images, voice recordings, and fabricated social media content became increasingly common across political propaganda, scam operations, and misleading public information. This trend significantly increased the complexity of verification work and highlighted the growing need for AI-focused monitoring, digital literacy, and prebunking initiatives.
To support rapid verification efforts, The Red Flag continued to strengthen collaboration through the Myanmar Fact-Checking Network (MFCN) Newsroom. Between April and June, 360 potential misinformation cases identified through Daily Alerts were reviewed and assessed using a standardized impact-rating methodology. From these, 81 fact-checks and prebunking outputs were collaboratively produced and published by MFCN members, with the majority focusing on political misinformation, conflict-related claims, military propaganda, AI-generated content, and public safety issues. Verification efforts also addressed emerging digital security risks and seasonal misinformation that could directly affect public behaviour and community safety.
Overall, the quarter demonstrated that Myanmar’s information disorder is becoming increasingly sophisticated and adaptive. While traditional propaganda remained highly active, the rapid adoption of AI-generated content and coordinated influence campaigns presents new challenges for journalists, fact-checkers, and civil society. These findings reinforce the importance of sustained monitoring, collaborative verification, early warning mechanisms, and proactive prebunking approaches to strengthen information integrity and public resilience in Myanmar.
2. Key Information Environment Trends
Public Sentiment, Thingyan Festival, and Misinformation Trends
In April, the Thingyan festival became one of the largest and most crowded public celebrations since the 2021 coup. Large public participation reflected both the public’s desire for normal daily life and the changing political atmosphere following the military’s political restructuring. Much of this misinformation was also connected to April Fool’s Day and was widely circulated online. The spread of large amounts of misinformation related to issues that attracted strong public interest, including fuel shortages, the odd-even fuel purchasing system, and weather-related news.
Political Transition/Changes, International Response and Detensions
As many political analysts and media outlets had predicted, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing officially changed his role and became the transitional president through the military-appointed parliament. Although the international community largely avoided openly supporting this political transition, China, Thailand, and Russia showed visible support for the new administration. The foreign ministers of both Thailand and China later visited Myanmar and held meetings with the newly appointed transitional president.
Following his transition to the presidency, the government announced a large amnesty on April 17, Myanmar New Year Day. More than 4,000 prisoners were released, including some political detainees and former President U Win Myint. State media presented the release as a sign of reconciliation and political goodwill. Later, on April 30, authorities announced that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi had been moved from prison to a house controlled by the military for continued detention. Around the same time, several local media outlets reported that Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi had met with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi during his visit to Myanmar. Although there was no strong official confirmation, the reports received wide public attention and created speculation about possible diplomatic discussions behind the scenes. At the same time, domestic and international campaigns continued to demand proof that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi remained alive and to call for her immediate release from detention. There were also many cases of disinformation related to U Win Myint and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, including AI-generated videos and images that were widely circulated by clickbait.
Peace Talks Proposal and Resistance Response
The new administration under the transitional president announced that within its first 100 days, it would invite Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs) to join peace talks and encourage members of the People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) to surrender and return to the legal system. However, many revolutionary groups strongly rejected these invitations, arguing that they were not sincere or politically meaningful. Several resistance organizations stated that genuine political dialogue could only begin after the military completely withdrew from politics and accepted responsibility for the peace process.
Propaganda Narratives and Information Welfare
During March and April, especially several narratives became widespread and had direct impacts on the ground situation. One common pattern involved presenting civilian-populated areas as military targets before carrying out airstrikes, followed by attempts to deny responsibility or hide evidence of possible military war crimes. Another widely circulated narrative claimed that thousands of resistance members had surrendered and joined the military after the election process. These claims were difficult to confirm independently but were repeatedly promoted through pro-military media channels.
Military Recruitment and Ground Realities
Another important propaganda campaign focused on promoting the image that citizens were voluntarily joining military service under the junta’s People’s Military Service Law. Many photographs, videos, and personal stories were shared through state media and social media platforms to support this narrative. However, independent observers and local reports continued to document cases of forced recruitment, intimidation, and pressure placed on communities to provide recruits. On April 2, the military also announced that Islamic religious leaders would be exempted from compulsory military service. This announcement appeared to be part of a broader effort to reduce criticism and ease concerns among religious minority communities. However, revolutionary groups operating in ethnic-controlled areas have also continued recruitment efforts.
Media Influence and Online Increments
Meanwhile, Popular News and Eleven Media continued to be widely viewed as pro-military media organizations. Military lobbyists and pro-junta figures openly claimed that these media outlets maintained direct relationships with senior military leaders and played an important role in shaping narratives favorable to the junta. In another notable incident, the Facebook page of the self-appointed transitional president Min Aung Hlaing, was reportedly removed only a few hours after it was launched, attracting significant public attention online.
Military Operations and Territorial Control
During March and April, military forces managed to regain control of several towns that had been under revolutionary control. Key locations included Falam in Chin State, Indaw in Sagaing Region, and Kutkai in Shan State, which was reportedly transferred by the TNLA to the MNDAA. Since August 2025, the military has continued a series of counter-offensives aimed at retaking territories previously controlled by resistance forces. At the same time, military operations increased in central Myanmar, especially in Sagaing, Magway, Rakhine, and Chin State, where resistance groups remain active and influential. In addition, martial law was imposed in 60 townships across nine states and regions, reflecting the military’s ongoing concerns about security and territorial control. The authorities announced that the state of emergency and martial law orders imposed in those townships would remain in effect for 90 days starting from April 23.
Contradiction Between Peace Messaging and Military Actions
Although the military-led transitional government publicly claimed that it was willing to engage in peace negotiations, military offensives continued aggressively under the command of the junta-appointed military chief. Ground attacks and airstrikes were carried out alongside the military-government’s political and diplomatic activities. This showed that while the administration publicly promoted dialogue, it continued to rely heavily on military force to maintain control. At the same time, propaganda campaigns, misinformation, and disinformation operations remained highly active through state-controlled media and coordinated social media networks, continuing to shape the country’s information environment during this important political period.
Rebranding the Military Leader and Seeking International Recognition
During May and June, one of the biggest political changes seen in Myanmar was the effort to present the military leader who seized power as if he were a president chosen by the people. This appeared to be part of a wider attempt to create the image of a democratic government. After taking on this new public role, he was welcomed by some neighboring countries and made official visits as the country’s president. Independent media also reported that he travelled to India and China, where several bilateral agreements were signed, although the details of those agreements have not been made public.
At the same time, China’s role in Myanmar became much more visible than before. The Myitsone Dam project, which has long been opposed by many Kachin communities and environmental groups, returned to public discussion. Chinese influence could also be seen in many other areas. Some political parties linked to the military were invited to China for exchange visits. Chinese organizations held activities with Myanmar media, and China became more active in talks with ethnic armed organizations. These developments suggested that China’s influence was expanding across political, economic, military, and social sectors.
These developments quickly became useful material for pro-military propaganda. Lobbies of the military widely claimed that major countries and neighboring states had already accepted the military leader as Myanmar’s legitimate president. At the same time, they launched disinformation campaigns against ASEAN, which has not officially recognized the military-led government. Singapore, Timor-Leste, and the Philippines were among the countries most frequently targeted because of their critical positions toward the military authorities. False social media posts claimed that people around the world rejected these countries, while other posts falsely suggested that Myanmar citizens wanted the country to leave ASEAN.
A clear difference could also be seen between the messages aimed at international audiences and those aimed at people inside Myanmar. Internationally, the military tried to present itself as a government seeking closer cooperation with ASEAN while enjoying support from powerful neighboring countries. Inside the country, however, propaganda channels argued that Myanmar did not need ASEAN’s recognition, was ready to leave the organization, and was strong enough to deal with each ASEAN member independently.
These two different narratives were promoted at the same time for different audiences. Because some ASEAN member states appear more willing than others to engage with the military authorities, it will remain important to monitor whether ASEAN’s position changes in the coming months. Reports that the military has hired international lobbying firms also make it necessary to continue observing how foreign governments respond to its efforts to gain greater international acceptance.
Democratic Image vs. Political Repression
June also marked Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s 81st birthday. During this period, the “Proof of Life” campaign, led by her son, became more active and received greater public support. Even so, the military authorities continued to ignore repeated requests to release recent video evidence showing her condition, allow her to speak with her son by phone, or respond to appeals from the international community.
Although the military government continued to present itself internationally as a democratic administration, its actions during Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s birthday told a different story.
People were prevented from praying for her, wearing flowers, or selling flowers to mark the occasion. On 19 June, some flower sellers were reportedly arrested for selling flowers associated with the campaign, while people wearing flowers were also detained. Individuals wearing sports shirts with the number “81” were accused of supporting terrorism, and some were arrested. An NLD parliment who offered food to monks in honour of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s birthday was also arrested and charged. These incidents suggested that peaceful acts of expression continued to face legal action despite the government’s efforts to project a democratic image.
Growing Divisions Within the Revolution
During May and June, reports of clashes between different revolutionary groups also became more common. Some armed groups under the National Unity Government (NUG) reportedly raided several local People’s Security Force (Pa La Pha) bases in Monywa, as well as camps belonging to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). There were also reports of targeted killings between different PDF groups. These incidents led to growing public concern. Many social media users expressed disappointment and argued that internal conflict was weakening public confidence in the revolutionary movement and reducing public support.
The military and its supporters used these developments to strengthen their own propaganda. They claimed that the resistance movement had already failed, that more young people were choosing to cooperate with the military, and that the resistance had become nothing more than armed groups fighting each other. These narratives were repeatedly shared to gain political and military advantage.
According to The Red Flag’s findings, it is true that some young people have left revolutionary groups and surrendered to the military. However, the number of these defections does not match the picture presented by military propaganda. The photos and videos shared by pro-military channels often suggest that hundreds or even thousands of young people have lost confidence in the revolution and are defecting to the military. Available evidence does not support claims on those numbers of amount.
Instead, these messages appear to be part of a broader propaganda effort aimed at creating the impression that the revolutionary movement is weakening while the military is gaining increasing public support. They may also be intended to support the military’s narrative that its “100-Day Plan” has been successful by exaggerating the number of defections and presenting a misleading picture of changing public opinion.
The “100-Day Plan”: Peace in Words, Violence in Reality
The military authorities also promoted what they called a “100-Day Plan” and publicly invited Ethnic armed groups to join a peace process. This appeared to be aimed at improving their international image. However, for many civilians, the military’s “100-Day Plan” has meant fleeing for their lives rather than feeling safer. Reports from the ground described a different situation. Airstrikes, military offensives, village burnings, killings, and arrests continued throughout the period. Arakan State experienced the highest number of reported airstrikes, while military operations also continued in Magway Region, Sagaing Region, and Chin State.
Military propaganda channels defended these operations by claiming that armed groups had rejected peace efforts and that the places being attacked were military positions rather than civilian areas such as schools or hospitals. These messages appeared to justify military operations while rejecting accusations of possible war crimes. When women and children were among those killed, propaganda channels often described them as supporters of armed groups instead of civilians.
Military Conscription and Propaganda Narratives
Military recruitment remained another issue affecting many communities. Reports suggested that recruitment by some revolutionary groups had also become a concern in their control areas. Some ethnic armed organizations introduced compulsory military service for people living under their control. At the same time, after enforcing the military service law, the military authorities reportedly continued to arrest young people in public places and force them into military service. Some were released after paying money, while others who could not pay were reportedly sent directly to the front lines.
Military-controlled media denied these reports and insisted that there was no forced recruitment. They also claimed that reports of extortion were false and stated that 95% most conscripts safely returned home after completing their service. However, interviews published by independent media with former recruits and their families described very different experiences. According to these accounts, many recruits received only limited military training before being sent into combat. Some reportedly died after being deployed to the front lines, while others were said to have been used in extremely dangerous positions during military operations.
Religious Hate Speech and Online Incitement
Religious and ethnic hate speech also continued to spread on social media platforms. Most of the content targeted Muslims, although some posts also attacked Christians. The destruction of a church in Kyein Chaung village, Kyauktaw Township, received widespread attention on social media. Some military supporters also encouraged people to report Muslims who rented houses or gathered in groups. These incidents warrant continued monitoring, as they may contribute to increased religious and ethnic tension.
Several other issues also attracted widespread public attention during this period. These included the temporary detention and later release of pro-military supporter Kyaw Myo Min, reports that China had detained ISP Executive Director Ko Min Zin, the deaths of film director Min Htin Ko Ko Gyi and writer Min Khite Soe San, claims that the humanitarian group led by actress Khine Hnin Wai was temporarily detained by the local PDF, and the military’s decision to change the lyrics of the revolutionary song “Thwe Thitsa”(အရေးကြီးပြီသီချင်း) and present it as a military marching song from the 1960s.
May and June are part of Myanmar’s rainy season, and during this period public attention was largely focused on weather-related issues such as heavy rainfall, flooding, rising water levels, and earthquakes. These topics were widely discussed on social media as people searched for updates and shared information about the changing weather conditions.
Seasonal Narratives and AI-Generated Disinformation
The same period also marked the reopening of basic education schools across Myanmar. As schools resumed classes, a large amount of misinformation and disinformation began to circulate online. One of the main narratives claimed that PDF forces were carrying out attacks against schools and deliberately targeting students and teachers. Many of these posts used AI-generated images to make the claims appear more convincing and to portray the PDF as responsible for violence against educational institutions. The Red Flag has published a detailed case study examining this disinformation campaign content in these seasonal narratives about Education.
Finally, one of the obvious changes during May and June was the growing use of artificial intelligence (AI). AI-generated images, videos, songs, and written content became much more common, not only in propaganda campaigns but also in everyday online communication. While AI offers many useful opportunities, it is also increasingly being used to produce disinformation, manipulated content, and online scams. For this reason, the misuse of AI has become an issue that deserves close attention and continued monitoring in the future.
3. Fact-checking Highlights
During April–June 2026, The Red Flag continued to support the Myanmar Fact-Checking Network (MFCN) Newsroom by identifying and prioritizing potentially harmful misinformation through its Daily Alert monitoring system. Throughout the quarter, 360 potential misinformation cases were submitted to the Newsroom for review and verification. Using a standardized impact-rating methodology, only narratives assessed as having moderate to high public impact (Ratings 3–5) were prioritized for collaborative fact-checking and newsroom discussion.
As a result, 81 fact-checks, verification articles, and prebunking contents were produced and published by MFCN member organizations during the quarter. The majority of these focused on political misinformation, conflict-related claims, military propaganda, AI-generated content, and public safety issues. Compared with previous quarters, the increasing volume of AI-generated images, videos, and fabricated narratives significantly increased the complexity of verification work, requiring additional digital forensic techniques and cross-source verification.
Political and conflict-related misinformation remained the dominant category throughout the quarter. Many false narratives attempted to manipulate public opinion regarding military operations, armed resistance groups, territorial control, and high-profile political figures. Several widely circulated claims involved fabricated reports about Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, President U Win Myint, the military leadership, Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs), and the National Unity Government (NUG). These narratives frequently combined recycled images, misleading captions, edited videos, or AI-generated content to increase credibility and public engagement.
Artificial intelligence emerged as one of the most significant verification challenges during the reporting period. Fact-checkers identified multiple AI-generated videos and images portraying fabricated meetings between political leaders, manipulated disaster footage, false military incidents, and misleading weather-related content. The increasing accessibility of generative AI tools has accelerated the production of highly convincing misinformation, making visual verification substantially more difficult than in previous reporting periods.
Seasonal misinformation also remained prominent throughout the quarter. During Thingyan, false information circulated regarding earthquakes, fuel shortages, and public safety. As schools reopened in May and June, misinformation increasingly targeted the education sector, including fabricated claims that resistance groups were attacking schools and teachers. Many of these narratives relied on AI-generated images designed to provoke fear and influence public perception. At the same time, severe weather, flooding, and earthquake-related misinformation spread widely across social media as public attention shifted toward seasonal risks.
In addition to reactive fact-checking, The Red Flag and MFCN continued to strengthen preventive approaches by publishing prebunking and digital security content. These included public awareness materials explaining emerging AI manipulation techniques, online scams, and digital safety practices, helping audiences recognize misleading content before it spreads widely. This preventive approach complements traditional fact-checking by strengthening public resilience against increasingly sophisticated information manipulation.
Overall, the quarter demonstrated that Myanmar’s misinformation landscape is evolving beyond conventional false claims toward coordinated influence operations that combine propaganda, emotional narratives, and AI-generated media. These findings highlight the growing importance of collaborative verification, cross-newsroom coordination, AI literacy, and proactive prebunking as essential components of Myanmar’s information integrity efforts.
4. Conclusion
The second quarter of 2026 demonstrated that Myanmar’s information environment continues to evolve in both scale and complexity. Political transition, military operations, international diplomatic developments, and seasonal events created fertile conditions for misinformation and disinformation to spread rapidly across multiple online platforms. At the same time, coordinated propaganda campaigns increasingly relied on AI-generated content, manipulated visuals, recycled media, and emotionally driven narratives to shape public perception and influence public discourse.
The findings from both monitoring and fact-checking activities indicate that misinformation is no longer limited to isolated false claims but has become part of broader influence operations targeting political legitimacy, conflict narratives, public safety, and social cohesion. The growing use of artificial intelligence has further complicated verification efforts, requiring more advanced technical skills, cross-platform monitoring, and faster collaborative responses among fact-checking organizations.
During the quarter, The Red Flag’s monitoring system and the Myanmar Fact-Checking Network (MFCN) continued to play an important role in identifying emerging misinformation trends, prioritizing high-impact narratives, and coordinating timely verification efforts. The collaborative newsroom model strengthened information sharing among partners and enabled fact-checkers to respond more effectively to harmful narratives affecting the public.
Looking ahead, strengthening information resilience will require continued investment in collaborative monitoring, AI-assisted verification, prebunking strategies, and media and information literacy initiatives. As information manipulation becomes increasingly sophisticated, proactive approaches that combine early warning, public education, and cross-organizational collaboration will be essential to protecting information integrity and supporting informed public decision-making in Myanmar.
